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If there is no goal in the whole of history of man’s lot, then 
we must put one in: assuming, on the one hand, that we have 
need  of a goal, and on the other that we’ve come to see 
through the illusion of an immanent goal and purpose. And 
the reason we have need of goals is that we have need of a 
will—which is the spine of us. ‘Will’ as the compensation of 
lost ‘belief’, i.e., for the idea that there is a divine  will, one 
which has plans for us. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachlaß Summer 1886–Spring 1887, KSA 12, 6[9] 
 
 
We are still growing continually, our sense of time and place, 
etc., is still developing. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachlaß April–June 1885, KSA 11, 34[124] 
 
 
‘Timeless’ to be rejected. At a particular moment of a force, 
an absolute conditionality of the redistribution of all forces is 
given: it cannot stand still. ‘Change’ is part of the essence, 
and therefore so is temporality—which, however, just 
amounts to one more conceptual positing of the necessity of 
change. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachlaß May–July 1885, KSA 11, 35[55] 
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Note on Translations of Nietzsche’s Works 
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sulted whenever possible, notably The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kauf-
mann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), and Writ-
ings from the Late Notebooks, ed. Rüdiger Bittner, trans. Kate Sturge 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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Metaphysical and Historical Claims in The Birth of Tragedy 
 
Katherine Harloe 
 
What is The Birth of Tragedy about? From a contemporary critical perspec-
tive, the very attempt to pose this question may appear hopelessly naive. 
Even if the furthest reaches of the complex and varied history of the recep-
tion of Nietzsche’s first book are ignored, debates among scholars over its 
coherence, content, and significance within Nietzsche’s thought have 
shown no signs of abating, and Montinari’s comment twenty-five years 
ago that ‘the entire problem of interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophical 
firstling is still wide open’ appears equally apposite today (Montinari 1980, 
p. 5). In this essay I wish to question an assumption which I believe has 
come increasingly to guide interpretation of The Birth of Tragedy, and 
which is common to many who hold very different substantive views of its 
content. This is the idea that it should be read primarily as a contribution to 
what was, admittedly, one of the major debates of German philosophy after 
Kant: that of the possibility of metaphysics. If this assumption is granted, 
the most important question to ask about Nietzsche’s first book becomes 
whether or not he there asserts or denies the possibility of ‘transcendent’ 
knowledge of the ultimate nature of the world. Regardless of the substan-
tive differences between the answers scholars have given to this question 
over the past few decades, agreement that The Birth of Tragedy is essen-
tially an exercise in metaphysics has informed many influential readings. 
Sometimes the assumption is very much a background presence in a 
discussion which focuses on different themes. Consider, for example, 
Alexander Nehamas’ views as put forward in his book Nietzsche: Life as 
Literature (Nehamas 1985). His interpretation of Nietzsche places the doc-
trine of perspectivism centre-stage and is primarily concerned with the 
writings of the 1880s rather than the 1870s. The Birth of Tragedy is, how-
ever, mentioned in order to support the following observation: 
Nietzsche seems to have believed that there are some ultimate facts, some non-
interpretive truths, concerning the real nature of the world ... he denied that 
these facts could ever be correctly stated through reason, language, and sci-
ence. Yet he also believed (and here the influence of Schopenhauer became 
dominant) that tragedy, primarily through the musically inspired, ‘Dionysian’ 
chorus, can intimate the final truth that the ultimate nature of the world is to 
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have no orderly structure: in itself the world is chaos, with no laws, no reason, 
and no purpose. (Nehamas 1985, pp. 42–43) 
The Birth of Tragedy is here invoked as a document of Nietzsche’s early 
faith in the possibility of metaphysics, and is thereby distinguished from 
the later writings, in which ‘Nietzsche comes to deny the very contrast 
between things-in-themselves and appearance which was presupposed by 
his discussion of tragedy’ (Nehamas 1985, p. 43). The assumption does 
rather more work in motivating the influential, deconstructive readings of 
The Birth of Tragedy offered by Paul de Man and Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe (de Man 1979, pp. 79–102; Lacoue-Labarthe 1971). As Henry 
Staten has convincingly shown, it is because de Man interprets The Birth of 
Tragedy as an attempt to depict an ‘ontological hierarchy’, according to 
which the Dionysian is genetically prior to the Apollonian, that his verdict 
on it as a text that is logocentric—and his consequent deconstruction—can 
operate (de Man 1979, pp. 83, 85; Staten 1990, pp. 187–216). More re-
cently, James I. Porter has argued against the view that any metaphysical 
thesis is asserted in The Birth of Tragedy and in favour of reading it as an 
attempt ‘to mimic and challenge—through a mixture of parody, irony, 
implausibility, and logical circularity—the metaphysical banalities that the 
work superficially conveys’ (Porter 2000a, p. 87). While his reconstruction 
of the content of Nietzsche’s argument could not be more opposed to that 
of Nehamas or de Man, his reinterpretation of Nietzsche as an anti-
metaphysician nevertheless leaves the question of metaphysics in the fore-
ground. 
This first interpretative question is usually thought to be bound up 
closely with a second contested issue: the Schopenhauerianism of Nietz-
sche’s first book. The connection seems straightforward enough: The Birth 
of Tragedy’s elaboration of the Apollonian-Dionysian polarity conspicu-
ously deploys Schopenhauerian language, and Schopenhauer’s magnum 
opus, The World as Will and Representation (Schopenhauer 1969 [Eng-
lish]; 1949a and b [German])1, offers a systematic metaphysics in the tradi-
tional sense of a set of interconnected claims about the ultimate nature of 
the world. We might, therefore, take The Birth of Tragedy’s Schopenhau-
erianism as an indicator of its metaphysical commitment: insofar as Nietz-
sche’s position there may justly be characterized as Schopenhauerian, he is 
defending a metaphysical thesis. It is my contention that this apparently 
plausible inference is in fact mistaken, and rests upon an oversimplification 
of what ‘Schopenhauer’ could have represented for Nietzsche at the time of 
_____________ 
1  Translations from Schopenhauer’s and Nietzsche’s Nachlaß and letters are my 
own. 
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writing The Birth of Tragedy. Appreciating this leads us to recognize that 
The Birth of Tragedy may be ‘Schopenhauerian’ yet not ‘metaphysical’ in 
any straightforward sense.  
My argument to this effect will proceed by means of a critique of one 
of the most recent attempts to give an overarching interpretation of The 
Birth of Tragedy: the aforementioned reading of Porter. Porter’s discussion 
is important as it exposes of some of the puzzles and difficulties that arise 
when the interpretative question with which I began is answered in the 
affirmative. He is correct to insist that certain aspects of The Birth of Trag-
edy’s ‘narrative structure’—its language, imagery, and train of argument—
call into question the notion that its author is ‘uncritically enthralled to a 
metaphysics that ... [he] later abandoned’ (Porter 2000a, p. 20). In reinter-
preting The Birth of Tragedy as an ‘attack on metaphysics’ (ibid., p. 28), 
however, and equating this with an attack on Schopenhauer, Porter repeats 
what I suggest are a mistaken interpretative assumption and attendant over-
simplification. By responding to his arguments, then, I hope to be able to 
indicate why both ways of answering the question of metaphysics in rela-
tion to The Birth of Tragedy miss what is really at issue. 
 
 
 
It would, of course, be impossible to provide an adequate response to 
Porter in the course of this essay. This is not just because his reading of 
The Birth of Tragedy is based on an detailed and broad-ranging consider-
ation of Nietzsche’s notebooks and early philological writings,2 but also 
because he attributes to Nietzsche a deliberate strategy of what Quentin 
Skinner has termed ‘oblique reference’ (Skinner 1969, pp. 32–35). Put 
crudely, this is the writing of something one does not believe in order to 
disguise as well as to set out what one means to say. As Skinner points out, 
oblique strategies pose particular problems of interpretation, assessment of 
which requires close attention to the possible linguistic (textual) contexts 
of a particular work in order to decide whether its author is subverting or 
sustaining the ideas, generic conventions, topoi and so on, of his predeces-
sors and contemporaries. Porter interprets The Birth of Tragedy as a sub-
versive text; the immediate target of its critique is Wagnerian and 
Schopenhauerian metaphysics. My comments here are intended to draw 
attention to some aspects of the Schopenhauerian and Wagnerian linguistic 
_____________ 
2  In addition to Porter 2000a, the focus of my discussion here, this reading is ex-
tended in Porter 2000b. 
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context, overlooked by Porter, which I believe support a different interpre-
tation.  
One of the cornerstones of Porter’s reading is his interpretation of the 
Dionysian as a ‘pleat in the texture of appearance’ (2000a, p. 49; see pp. 
33–50, passim) and hence of metaphysics as something ‘generated from 
within’ appearance itself. Repeatedly in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche 
seems to claim that the Dionysian is ontologically prior to the Apollon-
ian—‘the eternal and original artistic power that first calls the whole world 
of phenomena into existence’ (BT 25, quoted in Porter 2000a, p. 36). This 
message is, however, undermined by passages such as the allusion to 
Lucretius in The Birth of Tragedy 1, which implies that all divinities, Dio-
nysus included, are the product of dreams. Just as much as Apollo, then, 
who is explicitly associated with dreams and deception, the opening sec-
tion of The Birth of Tragedy provides a hefty hint that Dionysus is illusory: 
an aspect of human psychology rather than a constituent of the deeper re-
ality behind appearances. Nevertheless—and this is the flip-side of Porter’s 
reading—Nietzsche tells us that such illusions cannot simply be done away 
with. They are the product of the deep-seated human need to project some 
higher meaning onto existence. 
These are noteworthy observations, but do they, as Porter thinks, 
amount to a decisive move away from a Schopenhauerian or Wagnerian 
position? Let us consider the crucial passage where Nietzsche states that 
‘As Lucretius envisages it, it was in dream that the magnificent figures of 
the gods first appeared before the souls of men’ (BT 1, KSA 1, p. 26). The 
sentence continues by quoting Wagner:  
In dream the great image-maker saw the delightfully proportioned bodies of 
superhuman beings; and the Hellenic poet, if asked about the secrets of poetic 
procreation, would likewise have reminded us of dream and would have given 
an account much like that given by Hans Sachs in the Meistersinger: 
My friend, it is the poet’s task 
To mark his dreams, their meaning ask. 
Trust me, the truest phantom man doth know 
Hath meaning only dreams may show: 
The arts of verse and poetry 
Tell nought but dreaming’s prophecy. (ibid.) 
In the following paragraph, which continues the theme of dreaming, we are 
referred to Schopenhauer:  
Philosophical natures even have a presentiment that hidden beneath the reality 
in which we live and have our being there also lies a second, quite different 
reality; in other words, this reality too is a semblance, and Schopenhauer actu-
ally states that the mark of a person’s capacity for philosophy is the gift of 
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feeling occasionally as if people and all things were mere phantoms or dream-
images. (ibid.) 
Porter is, I think, correct to interpret these passages as implicating the Dio-
nysian and the supposedly higher reality it symbolizes in ‘appearances’, 
but how are we to read the specific allusions to Wagner and Schopenhauer 
in this context? 
The immediate Schopenhauerian allusion is to a passage from his 
Nachlaß,3 but the theme is treated at greater length in volume 2 of The 
World as Will and Representation, in a chapter tellingly titled ‘On Man’s 
Need for Metaphysics’ (Schopenhauer 1969, vol. 2, pp. 160–187/1949b, 
pp. 175–209). There Schopenhauer talks of man as an animal metaphysi-
cum, permanently afflicted by the desire for metaphysical knowledge. In 
the face of the evident suffering and misery of life, humans are compelled 
to wonder why the world exists. The desperate need for an answer to this 
question is, Schopenhauer says, the origin of all ‘metaphysical’ thought, 
both religious and philosophical: 
Temples and churches, pagodas and mosques, in all countries and ages, in 
their splendour and spaciousness, testify to man’s need for metaphysics, a 
need strong and ineradicable, which follows close on the physical. (1969, vol. 
2, p. 162/1949b, p. 177) 
The difference between religion and philosophy does not consist in the 
claim, common to both, to embody a truth beyond appearances, but rather 
in their mode of presentation. Religions provide a ‘popular metaphysics’ 
resting upon revelation, and can be true solely sensu allegorico. Philoso-
phy, by contrast, appeals to thought and conviction and claims to be true 
sensu proprio (1969, vol. 2, pp. 166–168/1949b, pp. 183, 185). Neverthe-
less, both arise from humans’ need, faced with the misery of life, to make 
‘metaphysical assumptions’ about the existence of another world whose 
real character is separated by ‘a deep gulf, a radical difference’ from any-
thing of which they can conceive (1969, vol. 2, p. 178/1949b, pp. 197, 
198). Belief in metaphysical doctrines is, then, a human cognitive response 
to misery and helplessness in the face of existence, and both religion and 
philosophy, as forms of metaphysics, gain their content by a projection of 
the antithesis of the world of ‘appearances’ into an assumed beyond. In this 
_____________ 
3  ‘He who does not feel occasionally as if people and all things were mere phantoms 
or dream-images has no gift for philosophy. For it arises out of the contrast of in-
dividual things with the Idea of which they are the appearance’ (Schopenhauer 
1864, p. 295). An annotated copy of this work survives among Nietzsche’s per-
sonal effects, although the date at which he purchased it is unknown (see Oehler 
1942, p. 21).  
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chapter of The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer presents a 
view of the origins of metaphysical thought which is surprisingly similar to 
Porter’s interpretation of the hidden message of The Birth of Tragedy 1.  
The heavily annotated copy of The World as Will and Representation 
which survives among Nietzsche’s personal possessions is part of the Col-
lected Works edited by Julius Frauenstädt and published in 1873–1874, 
after the appearance of The Birth of Tragedy (Oehler 1942, p. 21). While 
there can be no doubt that Nietzsche read The World as Will and Represen-
tation extensively in the years 1865–1872, it is impossible to prove which 
chapters he studied most attentively. It is, however, extremely likely that 
he was familiar with the chapter discussed above, as it contains Schopen-
hauer’s problematic and much-commented-upon claim that, unlike the 
systems of his predecessors, his metaphysics is not transcendent:  
And although no one can recognize the thing-in-itself through the veil of the 
forms of perception, on the other hand everyone carries this within himself, in 
fact he himself is it; hence in self-consciousness it must be in some way acces-
sible to him, although still only conditionally. Thus the bridge on which meta-
physics passes beyond experience is nothing but just that analysis of experi-
ence into phenomenon and thing-in-itself in which I have placed Kant’s 
greatest merit. For it contains the proof of a kernel of the phenomenon differ-
ent from the phenomenon itself. It is true that this kernel can never be entirely 
separated from the phenomenon, and be regarded by itself as an ens extramun-
danum; but it is known always only in its relations and references to the phe-
nomenon itself. The interpretation and explanation of the phenomenon, how-
ever, in relation to its inner kernel can give us information about it which does 
not otherwise come into consciousness. Therefore in this sense metaphysics 
goes beyond the phenomenon, i.e., nature, to what is concealed in or behind it 
( μ  	
), yet always regarding it only as that which appears in the 
phenomenon, not independently of all phenomenon. Metaphysics thus remains 
immanent, and does not become transcendent; for it never tears itself entirely 
from experience, but remains the mere interpretation and explanation thereof, 
as it never speaks of the thing-in-itself otherwise than in its relation to the 
phenomenon. This, at any rate, is the sense in which I have attempted to solve 
the problem of metaphysics, taking into general consideration the limits of 
human knowledge which have been demonstrated by Kant. (Schopenhauer 
1969, vol. 2, pp. 182–183/1949b, pp. 203–204)  
This claim was interrogated by Rudolf Haym in his 1864 essay on 
Schopenhauer, which Nietzsche read in 1866.4  
_____________ 
4  Nietzsche to Hermann Mushacke, 27 April 1866, KGB I 2, pp. 126–129; Nietzsche 
to Carl von Gersdorff, end-August 1866, KGB I 2, pp. 156–161 (see Barbera 
1994).  
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The likely linguistic contexts of the appeal of The Birth of Tragedy 1 to 
Wagner complement this picture of congruence between Nietzsche’s ar-
guments and Schopenhauerian themes. The passage Nietzsche quotes cen-
tres around the paradoxical notion of the ‘truest phantom’ or ‘illusion’ 
(wahrster Wahn), and is taken from Act III of Die Meistersinger, in which 
Wahn is a prominent theme.5 It is therefore relevant to consider Wagner’s 
letter to Ludwig II of Bavaria (Wagner 1911 [German]/1995 [English]), 
published in 1873 under the title Über Staat und Religion, which Nietzsche 
read in manuscript in 1869.6 In this letter, Wagner combines a Schopen-
hauerian metaphysical standpoint with a lengthy analysis of political and 
religious ideas as forms of Wahn, necessary illusions: 
Blindness is the world’s true essence, and not Knowledge prompts its move-
ments, but merely a headlong impulse, a blind impetus of unique weight and 
violence, which procures itself just so much light and knowledge as will suf-
fice to still the pressing need experienced at the moment. So we recognize that 
nothing really happens but what has issued from this not far-seeing Will that 
answers merely to the momentarily-expressed need. (1995, p. 10/1911, p. 8) 
Humans are the unwitting instruments of this blind striving for existence, 
and both patriotism (which induces them to place the ends of state above 
their own egoistic goals) and religion (which counsels resignation in the 
face of the wretchedness of existence) are ruses by which they are induced 
to serve the ends of Will. This outlook leads Wagner to give the following 
analysis of religious feeling:  
Its inmost kernel is denial of the world—i.e., recognition of the world as a 
fleeting and dreamlike state reposing merely on illusion—and struggle for Re-
demption from it, prepared-for by renunciation, attained by Faith. In true Reli-
gion a complete reversal thus occurs of all the aspirations to which the State 
had owed its founding and its organising: what is seen to be unattainable here, 
the human mind desists from striving-for upon this path, to ensure its reaching 
by a path entirely opposite. To the religious eye the truth grows plain that there 
must be another world than this, because the inextinguishable bent-to-
happiness cannot be stilled within this world, and hence requires another 
world for its redemption. What, now, is that other world? So far as the concep-
tual faculties of human Understanding reach, and in their practical application 
as intellectual Reason, it is quite impossible to gain a notion that shall not 
_____________ 
5  I am thinking in particular of Hans Sachs’ famous Wahn-monologue at the end of 
act III, scene 1. The passage Nietzsche cites is from the beginning of act III, scene 
2. 
6  See Barbera 1994, p. 219 (no. 4). As late as 1873, Nietzsche thought fit to praise 
this work of Wagner’s as ‘in the highest sense “edifying”’ (Nietzsche to Gersdorff, 
2 March 1873, KSB II 3, p. 131). 
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clearly show itself as founded on this selfsame world of need and change: 
wherefore, since this world is the source of our unhappiness, that other world, 
of redemption from it, must be precisely as different from the mode of cognis-
ance whereby we are to perceive that other world must be different from the 
mode which shews us nothing but this present world of suffering and illusion. 
(1995, pp. 23–24/1911, pp. 20–21, emphasis mine) 
Religious feeling is awesome in nature—Wagner calls it ‘wonder-working’ 
(wunderwirkend) and ‘sublime’ (erhaben) (1995, p. 25/1911, p. 21), but is 
nonetheless illusion for all that. In explicitly associating religious thought 
with illusion and dream, Wagner goes further than Schopenhauer does in 
the passages I have quoted, but both the language and the content of this 
recognizably Schopenhauerian train of thought foreshadow those aspects 
of The Birth of Tragedy 1 that Porter emphasizes.7  
If Porter’s argument that the Dionysian or the metaphysical originates 
as the compensatory fantasy of needy and suffering human beings is 
granted, it seems nevertheless that the elaboration of these thoughts in the 
opening sections of The Birth of Tragedy draws considerably on Schopen-
hauer’s treatment of the same theme. It is, moreover, not merely Nietz-
sche’s account of the origins of metaphysics that is Schopenhauerian in 
tenor. His discussion of the resurgence of the need for metaphysics in his 
contemporary era is also redolent of Schopenhauer. According to Nietz-
sche, this need is provoked anew by the eventual bankruptcy of the opti-
mistic, ‘Socratic’ belief that science can provide a fully satisfactory ex-
planation of the world (see especially BT 15, 18). The second half of 
Schopenhauer’s chapter ‘On Man’s Need for Metaphysics’ is likewise 
devoted to an extensive and scathing discussion of the ambitions of science 
to explain the world: 
Naturalism, or the purely physical way of considering things, will never be 
sufficient, it is like a sum in arithmetic that never comes out. Beginningless 
and endless causal series, inscrutable fundamental forces, endless space, be-
ginningless time, infinite divisibility of matter, and all this further conditioned 
by a knowing brain, in which alone it exists just like a dream and without 
which it vanishes—all these things constitute the labyrinth in which naturalism 
leads us incessantly round and round ... In fact, even if a man wandered 
through all the planets of all the fixed stars, he would still not have made one 
step in metaphysics. On the contrary, the greatest advance in physics will only 
_____________ 
7  The connection between metaphysical ‘knowledge’ and dreams is treated at length 
in Schopenhauer’s essay on spirit-seeing (Schopenhauer 1960 [German]/1974 
[English]). This discussion inspired Wagner’s 1870 centenary essay on Beethoven, 
which Nietzsche praises in the Preface to BT and in section 16 (KSA 1, pp. 23, 
104).  
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make the need for a system of metaphysics felt more and more, since the cor-
rected, extended, and more thorough knowledge of nature is the very know-
ledge that always undermines and finally overthrows the metaphysical as-
sumptions that till then have prevailed. (Schopenhauer 1969, vol. 2, pp. 177–
178/1949b, pp. 196–197) 
Like Nietzsche, Schopenhauer is disdainful of the ambitions of science, 
and believes that it will eventually refute itself, provoking a return to meta-
physical speculation. Not only are there general thematic parallels, but the 
very terms in which Nietzsche expresses the cultural importance of Soc-
ratism echo the cosmic imagery of Schopenhauer’s contemptuous dis-
missal.8 
An element of continuity with Schopenhauerian ideas is also, I would 
argue, implied by the imagery of veiling that Nietzsche uses to depict the 
insight offered by the Dionysian state: 
Now, hearing this gospel of universal harmony, each person feels himself to 
be not only united, reconciled or merged with his neighbour, but one with him, 
as if the veil of maya had been torn apart, so that mere shreds of it flutter be-
fore the mysterious primordial unity. (BT 1, KSA 1, pp. 29–30; see too BT 15, 
KSA 1, pp. 98–99; BT 24, KSA 1, p. 150) 
Porter points out that the veracity of this vision is far from assured, sug-
gesting that the subjunctive character of the ‘as if’-clause and the continued 
fluttering of the tattered veil imply that the Dionysian vision does not pro-
vide immediate insight into the beyond (2000a, pp. 51–52). He concludes 
that this represents a critique of Schopenhauer; but again, there are 
Schopenhauerian precedents. We have already seen Schopenhauer speak of 
‘the veil of the forms of perception’ in The World as Will and Representa-
_____________ 
8  ‘For the first time, thanks to this universality, a common network of thought was 
stretched over the whole globe, with prospects of encompassing even the laws of 
the entire solar system’ (BT 15, KSA 1, p. 100). They also contain echoes of Wag-
ner. Nietzsche characterizes the Socratic instinct for scientific knowledge as a 
‘sublime metaphysical illusion’ (BT 15, KSA 1, p. 99) and comments that without 
its influence, human energy would have been ‘applied instead to the practical, i.e., 
egotistical goals of individuals and nations’. The ‘wars of extinction’ that would 
have ensued would have led to a generalized and suicidal pessimism of the kind 
which, Nietzsche claims, ‘has existed throughout the entire world, wherever art has 
not appeared in one form or other, especially as religion or science, to heal and to 
ward off the breath of that pestilence’ (BT 15, KSA 1, pp. 100; see also p. 102). 
Wagner had likewise argued that patriotic or political Wahn is still too close to in-
dividual egoism to be stable, and will collapse into war unless supplemented by the 
illusions of faith (1995, pp. 15–19/1911, pp. 12–14). Nietzsche’s account of the 
way science functions as a form of illusion is thereby aligned with Wagner’s dis-
cussion of religion. 
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tion II, chapter 17, when wrestling with the thorny issue of human beings’ 
‘inner’ experience of the thing-in-itself (1969, vol. 2, pp. 182–183, quoted 
above). He resorts to this metaphor again in the following chapter, this 
time to confess the impossibility of an unshrouded view: 
Meanwhile it is to be carefully noted, and I have always kept it in mind, that 
even the inward observation we have of our own will still does not by any 
means furnish an exhaustive and adequate knowledge of the thing-in-itself ... 
in this inner knowledge, the thing-in-itself has indeed to a great extent cast off 
its veils, but still does not appear quite naked ... Accordingly we have to refer 
the whole world of phenomena to that one in which the thing-in-itself is mani-
fested under the lightest of all veils, and still remains phenomenon only insofar 
as my intellect, the only thing capable of knowledge, still always remains dis-
tinguished from me as the one who wills, and does not cast off the knowledge-
form of time even with inner perception. (Schopenhauer 1969, vol. 2, pp. 197, 
198/1949b, pp. 220–221)9  
These passages are taken from the second volume of The World as Will 
and Representation, which was added in the second edition of 1844 and 
forms a supplement to volume 1. There is no question that such statements 
are hard to reconcile with the confidence with which the thesis that the 
world is Will is presented in the first edition of Schopenhauer’s work. It is 
nevertheless evident that the terms of what Porter sees a radical critique of 
Schopenhauer are available from Schopenhauer himself.  
 
 
 
I have, I hope, succeeded in showing that allusions to these particular chap-
ters of The World as Will and Representation are prominent at several 
points in The Birth of Tragedy. Nietzsche’s selective allusions may fairly 
be said to emphasize this self-critical moment in Schopenhauer, but do 
they thereby amount to a wholesale rejection of whatever he may have 
understood the elder philosopher to stand for? An alternative interpretation 
is suggested by yet another apologia for the use of metaphysical lan-
guage—this time from Nietzsche’s own notebooks. The passage is from an 
early draft of Fragment 10[1], which survives labelled by Nietzsche as 
_____________ 
9  The imagery of the veil has a long pedigree in German philosophical aesthetics, 
evoked by Kant Goethe, Schiller, Novalis, Hegel, and others. See Gombrich 1985 
for some examples. The implication is always double-edged: a veil conceals as 
much as it reveals. It is this tradition that Nietzsche taps into with his remarks 
about the veiling and unveiling in BT 15 and in The Gay Science (GS Preface to 
the second edition 4, KSA 3, pp. 351–352; GS 57, KSA 3, pp. 421–422). 
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‘Fragment of an extended form of “The Birth of Tragedy” written in the 
first weeks of the year 1871’ (KSA 7, pp. 333ff.): 
If I ventured in passing to speak of genius and of appearance as if a knowledge 
that exceeded every bound stood at my disposal and as if I were able to see out 
of the pure, great eye of the world, in what follows it will be explained that in 
using this figurative language [Bildersprache] I do not believe that I have 
stepped beyond anthropomorphic bounds. But who could endure existence 
without such mystical possibilities? (KSA 14, p. 541) 
Porter states that Nietzsche’s position in The Birth of Tragedy is ‘not only 
that metaphysics is a fictional enterprise worthy of being shattered once 
and for all but also that its resurrection is an inescapable and constitu-
tional need deeply implanted in human nature’ (Porter 2000a, p. 9; em-
phasis mine). Although he recognizes that Nietzsche portrays metaphysical 
speculation as a matter of human need, his overall discussion of The Birth 
of Tragedy suggests that its argument is weighted heavily towards critique. 
In the passage above, however, we see Nietzsche underlining in poignant 
terms a conclusion that we have also seen Schopenhauer and Wagner em-
phasize: the need for a myth such as the metaphysical provides in order to 
endure existence. Nietzsche’s acknowledgement of this need, together with 
its Schopenhauerian precedent, raises the possibility that The Birth of 
Tragedy deploys Schopenhauer not in parodic fashion, as a weapon with 
which to shatter all such illusions, but rather as a means of developing 
them in a new and superior form.10  
This interpretation also coheres with Nietzsche’s comments about the 
work of Friedrich August Lange. Porter argues that it was reading Lange 
that caused Nietzsche to apostatize from Schopenhauer (Porter 2000a, pp. 
5, 9–16). Yet, in the same August 1866 letter to Gersdorff in which he 
praises Lange’s History of Materialism as ‘splendid and highly instructive’ 
(KGB I 2, p. 159), Nietzsche draws a different conclusion: ‘You see that 
even in the face of this most exacting critique our Schopenhauer remains 
for us, indeed, he almost becomes us even more.’ What Lange’s arguments 
show is, according to Nietzsche, that philosophy can only be a form of art, 
of which none other than Schopenhauer furnishes the highest example:  
If philosophy is art, then even Haym may hide from Schopenhauer; if philoso-
phy should be edifying, then I at least know no philosopher who edifies more 
than our Schopenhauer. (KGB I 2, p. 160) 
My suggestion is therefore that Nietzsche draws upon Schopenhauer in The 
Birth of Tragedy as part of his attempt to foster a new form of Wagnerian 
_____________ 
10  Note the echo in Nietzsche’s 1873 praise of Wagner’s ‘On State and Religion’ as 
‘highly “edifying”’, quoted in n. 6 above.  
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Wahn: an acknowledgement and indulgence of the need to find a higher 
meaning in existence, however illusory that meaning may be. This project 
may seem opposed to Schopenhauer’s goal of presenting a system of 
metaphysics in the grand style, yet there are sufficient counter-currents in 
The World as Will and Representation to enable Nietzsche to enlist his 
predecessor in the service of this enterprise. Schopenhauer claims that his 
philosophy embodies a set of ‘truths’ (1969, vol. 2, p. 185/1949b, p. 206), 
yet not in the sense that it presents a system of conclusions derived deduc-
tively from true premises, nor because it relies on some form of privileged 
intuition. Rather, it is true in virtue of providing, in contrast to science, an 
‘understanding’ (Verständniß), ‘interpretation’ (Auslegung), or ‘decipher-
ing’ (Entzifferung) of the world of phenomena which is, so he claims, rich, 
satisfying and complete (1969, vol. 2 pp. 184–186/1949b, pp. 204–205). It 
is such a humanly satisfying interpretation of existence that, according to 
the arguments of The Birth of Tragedy, only art can provide. Nietzsche 
picks up on those elements of The World as Will and Representation which 
can be redeployed creatively in order to support this insight. The presenta-
tion of Schopenhauer which results from his refashioning is, admittedly, 
partial and one-sided. It may nevertheless be concluded that The Birth of 
Tragedy extends Schopenhauerian themes and concerns in order to ham-
mer its message home. 
The Birth of Tragedy’s co-option of Schopenhauer extends further than 
this, however. Nietzsche does not stop at drawing upon his predecessor’s 
arguments in order to announce the crisis of science; he also dramatizes 
this crisis and casts Schopenhauer in a leading role. He does so by con-
structing a narrative which has its beginnings in sixth-century Greece, and 
which locates Schopenhauer—along with Aeschylus, Sophocles, Eurip-
ides, Socrates, Kant, and Wagner—at points along a cultural development 
that will culminate in a new form of tragic art.11 This chronology is puta-
tively historical, but insofar as it may be characterized as a form of illusion 
that aims, via a representation of the past, to generate a constellation of 
_____________ 
11  This comment assumes that the ‘rebirth’ of tragedy Nietzsche envisages in The 
Birth of Tragedy is, indeed, a Wagnerian Renaissance. Although this has some-
times been questioned, it still seems to me the best way to make sense not only of 
The Birth of Tragedy but of the references to Wagner in Nietzsche’s notes and let-
ters of the early 1870s. The scope of the rebirth Nietzsche has in mind is, however, 
far too broad and indeed open-ended to encompass Wagner alone. Although Wag-
ner is identified with the fulfilment of this ideal in The Birth of Tragedy, this is 
compatible with the view that he later retracted this association and, as occurred in 
Ecce Homo, disavowed The Birth of Tragedy’s Wagnerianism without disowning 
the ‘hope’ that speaks out from the work (EH III BT 1 and 4). 
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beliefs and attitudes that legitimate a particular form of cultural activity, it 
might more aptly be termed ideological. Its function is to alert its readers to 
the climacteric shift taking place in European culture and to raise their 
hopes for tragedy’s rebirth. 
Nietzsche’s most general verdict on Schopenhauer’s significance 
within this narrative comes in The Birth of Tragedy sections 18 and 19, 
when he is describing the disintegration of the Socratic-optimistic outlook: 
The catastrophe slumbering in the womb of theoretical culture is gradually be-
ginning to frighten modern man ... Meanwhile great natures with a bent for 
general problems have applied the tools of science itself, with incredible de-
liberation, to prove that all understanding, by its very nature, is limited and 
conditional, thereby rejecting decisively the claim of science to universal va-
lidity and universal goals. Thanks to this demonstration it has been recognized 
for the first time that it is a delusion [Wahnvorstellung] to believe that we can 
penetrate to the innermost essence of things by following the chain of cau-
sality. The hardest-fought victory was won by the enormous courage and wis-
dom of Kan t  and Schopenhaue r , a victory over the optimism which lies 
hidden in the nature of logic and which in turn is the hidden foundation of our 
culture ... This insight marks the beginning of a culture which I now dare to 
describe as a tragic culture. Its most i portant feature lies in putting wisdom 
in place of science as its highest goal. (BT 18, KSA 1, pp. 117–118) 
Let us recall then, how Kant and Schopenhauer made it possible for the spirit 
of Ge rman  ph i l o sophy  ... to destroy scientific Socratism’s contented 
pleasure in existence by demonstrating its limits, and how this demonstration 
ushered in an incomparably deeper and more serious consideration of ethical 
questions and art, one which can be defined as the conceptual formulation of 
D ionys i ac  w i sdom. In what direction does this mysterious unity of Ger-
man music and German philosophy point, if not towards a new form of exist-
ence, the content of which can only be guessed at from Hellenic analogies? 
(BT 19, KSA 1, p. 128) 
In these remarks, Schopenhauer is lauded (alongside Kant) for having 
demonstrated the bankruptcy of the Socratic attempt to view the world as 
amenable to human understanding. The philosophers are not praised for 
their residual hope for a form of knowledge that transcends the bounds of 
experience, but rather because of the demonstration their arguments furnish 
of those very bounds. Although it is Socrates whom Nietzsche dubs ‘the 
vortex and turning point of so-called world history’ (BT 15, KSA 1, p. 
100), in The Birth of Tragedy 18 and 19, Kant and Schopenhauer appear 
almost as important as actors on the world-historical stage. In finally dis-
crediting Socratism, they clear the way for the replacement of corrosive 
scientism with a ‘new form of existence’: a renewed kind of artistic orien-
tation to the world. Schopenhauer is significant in this story not as the last 
metaphysician, but rather as the philosopher who demonstrates the need for 
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a new myth and who anticipates its form.12 In doing so, he merits praise as 
an augur of the rebirth of tragedy. His successor, both in this prophesying 
and in this anticipating, is Nietzsche himself. 
 
 
 
This paper has tried to rehabilitate some claims about The Birth of Tragedy 
which may seem rather traditional: namely, the positive character of its 
appropriation of Schopenhauer and Wagner, and the importance of the 
(quasi-)historical structure of its argument. Being traditional does not, of 
course, amount to being mistaken, and I hope I have shown that such 
claims can be supported by crediting Nietzsche with a less naive reception 
of Schopenhauer than has sometimes been suggested. Nietzsche famously 
warns philosophers to be vigilant about the unnoticed and subtle commit-
ments inherent in the grammar of our language (BGE 2, KSA 5, p. 54; TI 
‘“Reason” in Philosophy’ 5, KSA 6, p. 78), but the manner in which the 
areas and positions of long-running debates come to be defined may occa-
sionally be just as insidious.13 
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